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Abstract
Wepresent cost sharingmethods for connected facility location games that are cross-monotonic and
competitive and that recover a constant fraction of the cost of the constructed solution. The novelty
of this paper is that we use randomized algorithms and that we share the expected cost among the
participating users. As a consequence, our cost sharing methods are simple and achieve attractive
approximation ratios. We also provide a primal-dual cost sharing method for the connected facility
location game with opening costs.
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1. Introduction
The problem of achieving truth-revealing or strategyproof mechanisms for sharing the
cost of deploying a network infrastructure has recently received growing attention in com-
puter science. In this work we are interested in the design of cost sharing mechanisms
that would incite agents to cooperate to share the cost of the network facility and to reveal
their true value for receiving the service, i.e., group-strategyproof mechanisms for which
truthfulness is a dominant strategy for every user or coalition of users.
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Suppose we are given a set U of (potential) users that want to utilize a common service.
Each user j ∈ U has a utility uj , which corresponds to the price she is willing to pay for
the service. If j is asked to pay more than uj , she prefers to not receive the service. For
each set Q ⊆ U of users, let C(Q) denote the cost of servicing all users in Q. The task
is to design a cost sharing mechanism, i.e., an algorithm that determines (i) a set Q ⊆ U
of participating users that receive the service, and (ii) how to distribute the servicing cost
C(Q) among all users inQ such that each user j ∈ Q is willing to pay her cost share, pj .
The beneﬁt of a user j is uj − pj if j ∈ Q, and zero if j /∈ Q. We assume that each user
is selﬁsh and hence may misreport her utility so as to maximize her beneﬁt. A cost sharing
mechanism is strategyproof if each user has no incentive to misreport her true utility; it is
said to be group-strategyproof if the same holds even if users collude.
Given a set Q of participating users, a cost sharing method  computes a cost share
j (Q) for each user j ∈ Q. We are particularly interested in cost sharing methods that are
cross-monotonic, i.e., that have the property that the cost share of each individual user never
increases as the set of participating users grows. More formally, a cost sharing method  is
cross-monotonic if it satisﬁes
∀Q′ ⊆ Q ⊆ U, ∀j ∈ Q′, j (Q′)j (Q).
The importance of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods is due to a result of Moulin
and Shenker [6]: Let  be a cross-monotonic cost sharing method. Then, the following
mechanism is group-strategyproof. InitializeQ← U . If for each user j ∈ Q the cost share
j (Q) is less than or equal to her reported utility, stop. Otherwise, remove fromQ all users
whose cost shares are larger than their utilities, and repeat.
It is well known that competitiveness and cost recovery are conﬂicting objectives for sev-
eral games such as facility location and Steiner tree [5]. In this paper, we are interested in cost
sharingmethods that are cross-monotonic, and satisfy competitiveness and approximate cost
recovery. Competitiveness requires that the participating users in Q are not charged more
than the cost, C∗(Q), of an optimal solution, i.e.,
∑
j∈Q j (Q)C∗(Q). Cost recovery
states that the total cost paid by the users covers the cost C(Q) of the constructed solution,
i.e.,
∑
j∈Q j (Q)C(Q). Ideally, we may want to require that the constructed solution is
optimal and therefore
∑
j∈Q j (Q) = C∗(Q). However, we cannot enforce this condition if
the underlying problem is NP-hard.We therefore relax the cost recovery condition and only
require that a constant fraction 1/, for some 1, of the cost of the constructed solution
is recovered:
∑
j∈Q j (Q)C(Q)/. We call such a cost sharing method a -approximate
cost sharing method.
Related work. Cross-monotonic cost sharing mechanisms have been devised byMoulin and
Shenker [6] when the optimal cost function is a submodular function of the set U . This is
not the case for several network design problems such as Steiner tree, facility location, or
rent-or-buy network design.
Jain andVazirani [5] presented a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the minimum
spanning tree game and therefore a 2-approximate cost sharing method for the Steiner tree
game.More recently, Devanur et al. [1] proposed strategyproofmechanisms for vertex cover
and facility location games based on primal-dual algorithms. However, their algorithms are
not group-strategyproof. In all thesemethods, the cost shares are closely related to a feasible
dual solution generated by the algorithm and therefore competitiveness and approximate
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cost recovery are immediate consequences of the approximation guarantee achieved by the
algorithm.
Very recently, Pàl and Tardos [7] proposed cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for
facility location and single-source rent-or-buy network design. Their method is based on a
novel idea of using primal-dual algorithms to obtain cross-monotonic cost sharing meth-
ods. Roughly speaking, the cost share is ﬁxed when the user is connected to the network.
However, an underlying ghost process continues to contribute to connect other users to
the network. They present a 3-approximate cost sharing method for facility location and a
15-approximate cost sharing method for single-source rent-or-buy network design.
Among the approximation algorithms for single-source rent-or-buy developed in litera-
ture, we mention the primal-dual based 4.55-approximation of Swamy and Kumar [8] and
the recent 3.55-approximation obtained through a novel and simple randomized algorithm
proposed by Gupta et al. [3]. We will show how ideas of this last work can be turned into a
cross-monotonic cost sharing method that recovers a larger fraction of the cost.
Our contribution. In this paper, we present cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for con-
nected facility location games. Our contribution is twofold.
We present a novel idea of sharing the expected cost of a randomized algorithm. Recently,
Gupta et al. [3] gave a simple randomized algorithm for the single-source rent-or-buy
problem. Using their algorithm, we deﬁne random cost shares and prove that the expected
cost shares are cross-monotonic, competitive, and with high probability recover at least a
1
4 (1+ ε)−1-fraction of the constructed solution, where ε > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
Unfortunately, to compute the expected cost shares in polynomial time, it seems that one
needs to derandomize the algorithm of Gupta et al. Despite some effort, we were not able to
do so. However, we believe that the idea of sharing the expected cost will lead to attractive
approximation ratios for cost sharing methods in the future. In a recent independent work
by Gupta et al. [4] a similar idea is pursued to obtain a 4.5-approximate cross-monoto-
nic cost sharing method for the single-source rent-or-buy problem. The authors show how
to derandomize a version of the algorithm of Gupta et al. [3] at the expenses of a slight
weakening of the approximation guarantee to compute cost shares in polynomial time.
Our second contribution is to extend the recent result of Pál andTardos [7] to the connected
facility location game with opening costs. In general, an algorithm for connected facility
location consists of a ﬁrst phase, in which users are grouped into clusters, with every
cluster being represented by a location point, and a second phase, in which all locations are
connected by a Steiner tree. The 15-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method of
Pál and Tardos is restricted to the case in which locations can be opened at every point of
the network and at zero cost. This is clearly not realistic in many applications in which only
speciﬁc sites can host facilities and the cost of the network is formed by the individual costs
of the opened facilities plus the cost of deploying a high bandwidth network infrastructure
to connect all facilities. We give a 30-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method
for this more general problem.
2. Problem deﬁnition
In the connected facility location problem (CFL) we are given an undirected graph
G = (V ,E) with non-negative edge costs c : E → R+, a set F ⊆ V of potential facilities
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with opening cost fi for each facility i ∈ F , a set D ⊆ V of demands (or agents, users),
and a parameter M > 1. The goal is to open a subset F ⊆ F of facilities, to connect
each demand j ∈ D to the closest open facility i(j) ∈ F , and to build a Steiner tree T
connecting all open facilities in F . The objective is to minimize the sum of the opening
costs, the connection costs, andM times the Steiner tree cost, i.e.,∑
i∈F
fi + ∑
j∈D
c(j, i(j))+M · c(T ),
where c(·, ·) is the shortest path distance with respect to c, and c(T ) is the cost of the edges
in the Steiner tree T . We may assume without loss of generality that a root node r ∈ F ,
which is open in some optimal solution, is known in advance. (Otherwise, we could try all
at most |V | possibilities for r .)
In rent-or-buy network design problems an edge e can either be bought at costM · ce, or
rented at cost ce; a bought edge can be used by an arbitrary number of paths, while a rented
edge e costs ce for each path that uses it.
The single-source rent-or-buy problem (SSRB) is a special case of CFL, where a facility
can be opened at any node and all opening costs are zero, i.e., F = V and fi = 0 for all
i ∈ F . The problem then essentially reduces to establishing a minimum cost network such
that each demand j ∈ D is connected to the root r by a path.
3. Single-source rent-or-buy game
Gupta et al. [3] presented a randomized approximation algorithm for SSRB. For a given
set D of demands, the algorithm works as follows:
SimpleCFL(D):
1. Mark each demand j ∈ D with probability 1/M . Let D′ ⊆ D denote the set of
marked demands.
2. Construct a ST-approximate Steiner tree T on F = D′ ∪ {r}.
3. Connect each demand j /∈ D′ to its closest facility in F .
Gupta et al. prove that SimpleCFL has an expected approximation ratio of (2 + ST),
where ST denotes the approximation ratio of the Steiner tree algorithm used in Step 2.
For a given subset Q ⊆ D of demands, we use SimpleCFL(Q) to deﬁne a random cost
share j (Q) for each demand j ∈ Q and prove that the expected cost shares j (Q), deﬁned
as j (Q) = 14E
[
j (Q)
]
, are cross-monotonic. Moreover, we show that the expected cost
shares are competitive and with high probability recover at least a 14 (1 + ε)−1-fraction of
the cost of the constructed solution, where ε > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
3.1. Cost shares
We approximate the Steiner tree in Step 2 by computing a minimum spanning tree on
the metric completion of F , denoted by G(F). It is known that a minimum spanning tree
on G(F) is a 2-approximation of the optimal Steiner tree on F , see, e.g., [9]. We compute
the minimum spanning tree on G(F) by running Edmonds’ primal-dual algorithm [2] to
compute a minimum branching on a graph G(F), which is obtained fromG(F) if for each
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edge in G(F) we also add the reversed edge. Having computed a minimum branching
on G(F), we obtain a minimum spanning tree onG(F) by simply discarding directions of
edges.We associate the standard notion of timewith the primal-dual branching algorithm on
G(F).At time t , let sj (t) denote the number of vertices in the strongly connected component
containing j . We deﬁne j (t) = 1/sj (t) if the component containing j does not contain
the root, and j (t) = 0 otherwise. Jain and Vazirani [5] showed that for the Steiner tree
game the cost shares j =
∫∞
0 j (t)dt are cross-monotonic. We will exploit this fact later
to prove cross-monotonicity for the expectation of the cost shares deﬁned below.
We deﬁne j ’s random cost share with respect toQ as
j (Q) =
{
M · ∫∞0 j (t) dt if j ∈ F and
c(j, F ) if j /∈ F. (1)
Here, c(j, F ) denotes the shortest path distance from j to a facility in F . Note that both
j (t) and c(j, F ) are random variables.
3.2. Cross-monotonicity
We next prove that , deﬁned as j (Q) = 14E
[
j (Q)
]
for eachQ ⊆ D, j ∈ Q, is cross-
monotonic. Essentially, the argument is as follows. Let Q′ ⊆ D be a subset of demands.
Consider the cost shares deﬁned by SimpleCFL(Q′) and letF ′ ⊆ Q′ denote the set of open
facilities.Assume thatwe add a demand k toQ′. Let the new set of demands beQ = Q′∪{k}.
We use F ⊆ Q to denote the set of open facilities with respect to Q. Conditioned on the
event that in SimpleCFL(Q) the outcomes of the coin ﬂips for demands in Q′ are the
same as before, we have two possibilities for F : (i) F = F ′ ∪ {k} (probability 1/M), or (ii)
F = F ′ (probability 1− 1/M).
If k becomes part of F , the cross-monotonicity of the Steiner tree game implies that the
cost share of each demand j ∈ F ′ can only decrease. Moreover, the connection cost of each
demand j ∈ Q′ \ F ′ can only decrease because of the additional option to connect to k.
If k does not become part of F , the cost share of each facility j ∈ F ′ remains the same,
and the cost share of each j ∈ Q′ \ F ′ can only decrease, since the shortest path distance
from j to F can only decrease (via k ∈ Q′ \ F ′).
Lemma 1.  is a cross-monotonic cost sharing method.
Proof. Let Q′ ⊂ D be an arbitrary subset of demands, and let Q = Q′ ∪ {k} for some
k /∈ Q′. It is sufﬁcient to show that for each j ∈ Q′, j (Q′)j (Q). Throughout the proof,
let F ′ and F , respectively, denote the set of open facilities ofQ′ andQ. We have
E
[
j (Q)
]= ∑
O⊆Q
E
[
j (Q) |F = O
] · P[F = O]
= ∑
O⊆Q′
(
E
[
j (Q) |F = O
] · P[F = O]
+E[j (Q) |F = O ∪ {k}] · P[F = O ∪ {k}]
)
.
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From the discussion above, we know that for each j ∈ Q′ and for each O ⊆ Q′,
E
[
j (Q) |F = O
]
 E
[
j (Q′) |F ′ = O
]
and
E
[
j (Q) |F = O ∪ {k}
]
 E
[
j (Q′) |F ′ = O
]
.
Thus,
E
[
j (Q)
]
 ∑
O⊆Q′
E
[
j (Q′) |F ′ = O
] · (P[F = O]+ P[F = O ∪ {k}] ).
The proof now follows from the observation that for each O ⊆ Q′,
P[F = O]+ P[F = O ∪ {k}] = P[F ′ = O] . 
The next lemma shows that the cost share of a demand j /∈ F can be computed efﬁciently.
We are not able, however, to efﬁciently compute j ’s cost share if j ∈ F .
Lemma 2. Let Q ⊆ D, and let j ∈ Q be a demand. The expected connection cost of j
with respect toQ can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof.Consider the setQ− = Q\{j} of all demands except j . Let v1, v2, . . . , vl , l =
∣∣Q−∣∣,
denote the demands inQ− ordered according to non-decreasing distances from j . Then,
E
[
j (Q) | j /∈ F
]= 1
M
c(j, v1)+ 1
M
(
1− 1
M
)
c(j, v2)
+ 1
M
(
1− 1
M
)2
c(j, v3)+ . . .
= 1
M
l∑
i=1
(
1− 1
M
)i−1
c(j, vi). 
3.3. Competitiveness and cost recovery
For a subsetQ ⊆ D of demands, let C(Q) be a random variable denoting the cost of the
solution of SimpleCFL(Q). We use C∗(Q) to denote the cost of an optimal solution for
Q.
Lemma 3. The cost shares j (Q) = 14E
[
j (Q)
]
are competitive and, for any constant
ε > 0, with high probability recover at least a 14 (1 + ε)−1-fraction of the cost of the
constructed solution.
Proof. From the analysis of Gupta et al. [3] we know that the expected cost E[C(Q)] of the
solution is at most 4C∗(Q). Moreover, E[C(Q)] =∑j∈Q E[j (Q)]. We conclude that
∑
j∈Q
j (Q) = 14E
[∑
j∈Q
j (Q)
]
C∗(Q).
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ByMarkov’s inequality we have with probability at most (1+ε)−1, for any constant ε > 0,
that C(Q) > (1+ ε)E[C(Q)]. Thus, by rerunning the algorithm log(n)/ log(1+ ε) times,
SimpleCFL(Q) computes a solution such that with high probability
∑
j∈Q
j (Q)
1
4
(1+ ε)−1 · C(Q). 
Theorem 1. The cost shares j (Q) = 14E
[
j (Q)
]
are cross-monotonic, competitive, and,
for any constant ε > 0, with high probability recover at least a 14 (1+ ε)−1-fraction of the
cost of the constructed solution.
4. Connected facility location game
Recently, Pál andTardos [7] gave a 15-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharingmethod
for the facility location problem and the single-source rent-or-buy problem. Their cute idea
is to consider two processes: A “ghost” process to determine the cost shares and a “real”
process constructing a solution to the problem. The ghost process is designed in a way that
the cost shares are trivially cross-monotonic. The difﬁcult part is to link the ghost process
to the real process and to prove that at least a constant fraction of the cost of the computed
solution is recovered.
We extend the result of Pál and Tardos to the connected facility location game with
opening costs. Using similar ideas, we give a cross-monotonic cost sharing method that is
competitive and recovers at least a 130 -fraction of the cost of the solution.
We make the simplifying assumption that the edges of G consist of a continuum of
points. We use the term location to refer to both original vertices and intermediate points.
Basically, the algorithmworks as follows.We ﬁrst form clusters around some locations such
that each cluster contains at leastM demands; call these locations centers. The clusters are
then connected by building a Steiner tree T on the centers. Moreover, for each cluster
we identify a facility that is opened and to which all demands in the cluster are assigned.
Finally, we buy the shortest path from each center to the corresponding facility. Using the
idea of Swamy and Kumar [8], we can transform the Steiner tree on the centers into a tree
on original vertices of the graph without increasing the cost.
4.1. Ghost process
For a given set Q ⊆ D of demands, we run the following ghost process to determine
three different cost shares, j (Q), ′j (Q), and ′′j (Q), for each j ∈ Q. The ﬁnal cost share
of j will be a combination of the three.
We associate a notion of time with the process. For each demand j , we have a ghost ball
Bj (t), which is centered at j , and has radius equal to the current time t . WhenM or more
balls intersect a common location p, we open p. We use tp to refer to the time when p is
opened andQp to denote the set of demands that are responsible for the opening of p, i.e.,
all demands j that satisfy c(j, p) tp. We say that the demands inQp form a cluster.
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All locations open at time t form a set C(t). C(t) can be seen as being partitioned into
connected components: A connected component C is an inclusion maximal subset of C(t)
such that for any two locations p and q of C, all locations along the path from p to q
are contained in C. Consider the evolution of C(t) over time. Initially, C(0) is empty. With
increasing time, components start to appear. Each component C starts as a single location
p. As time progresses, C grows uniformly like a ball with center p. Eventually, two or
more components touch and are merged into a single component. Observe that the growing
of components in the ghost process is very similar to the growing of components in the
standard primal-dual algorithm for Steiner trees. The difference, however, is that in the
ghost process new components may appear at arbitrary locations over time, while in the
primal-dual algorithm we start to grow components from a ﬁxed set of locations.
A demand j is connected to a component C of C(t) at time t , if Bj (t) ∩ C = ∅. For
each demand j , let tj denote the time when j becomes connected to some component for
the ﬁrst time, and let t ′j denote the time when j becomes connected to a component that
contains the root. For a component C of C(t), let Q(C) denote the set of demands that are
connected to C at time t . For a connected demand j , let sj (t) denote the maximum size
|Q(C)| over all components C of C(t) that j is connected to at time t .
At time t , the contribution of demand j to the opening cost of a facility i is max(0,
t − c(j, i)). If the total contribution towards a facility i equals the opening cost fi , we open
i. Let ti denote the time when facility i is opened, and letQi denote the set of demands that
contribute to the opening of i at time ti .
For each demand j ∈ Q, we deﬁne three different cost shares:
j (Q) = tj ,
′j (Q) = tj +M ·
∫ t ′j
tj
1
sj (t)
dt, and
′′j (Q) = min
(
min
i:j∈Qi
ti , min
i:j ∈Qi
c(j, i)
)
.
Lemma 4. , ′, and ′′ are cross-monotonic cost sharing methods.
Proof. (See also [7].) Consider a setQ′ ⊂ D of demands and assume we add one additional
demand k to Q′. By adding demand k, at any time t , the set C(t) can only become larger.
Thus, the connection time tj of a demand j ∈ Q′ can only become smaller. Moreover, since
the number of demands that are connected to a component C of C(t) at time t can only
become larger, sj (t) can only increase for a demand j ∈ Q′. Furthermore, by adding k to
Q′, the opening time ti of any facility i can only become smaller. 
4.2. Algorithm
We run the ghost process but take the following rules into account in order to decide
which locations and facilities are eventually opened.
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• Weopen a locationp at time tp only if there is no other open location q with c(p, q)2tp.
• We open a facility i at time ti only if there is no other open facility k with c(i, k)2ti .
Locations that are opened in the above process are called centers. Let F ′ denote the set
of facilities that were opened. As will be seen below, these rules assure that (i) all clusters
Qp with center p are disjoint and (ii) all setsQi with i ∈ F ′ are disjoint. The ﬁnal solution
is constructed as follows. For each open cluster Qp, we determine a facility, i(p), which
is open and closest to center p; we say that i(p) is the facility of clusterQp. Let F denote
the set of all facilities i(p) corresponding to open clusters Qp, i.e., F = {i ∈ F ′ : i =
i(p) for some centerp}.We assign all demands of a clusterQp to its facility i(p). Demands
that are not contained in any open cluster are assigned to the facility of their closest center.
We build a Steiner tree on the centers and for each center p buy the shortest path from p
to the facility i(p) of the cluster. This makes sure that the facilities in F are connected.
Observe that no demand is assigned to a facility in F ′ \ F . We therefore close all facilities
in F ′ \ F .
4.3. Analysis
Lemma 5. For any two centers p and q,Qp andQq are disjoint.
Proof.Assume otherwise, i.e.,Qp∩Qq = ∅. Let j be a demand that is contained inQp and
in Qq . Then, c(j, p) tp and c(j, q) tq . Without loss of generality assume that tp tq .
When we are about to open q, we have c(p, q)c(j, p)+ c(j, q) tp + tq2tq , which is
a contradiction, since then q would not be opened. 
Lemma 6. For any two open facilities i and k,Qi andQk are disjoint.
Proof.Assuming that we open all facilities in F ′, we can prove the lemma analogously to
Lemma 5. Since F ⊆ F ′, the lemma also holds for facilities in F . 
Lemma 7. Let j ∈ Qp for some center p. Then tp3j . For each demand j that does not
belong to any open cluster, there is a center p such that c(j, p)3j .
Proof. (See also [7].) Let j ∈ Qp for some center p and assume that tp > 3j . Let q be the
location that deﬁnes j , i.e., j tq and jc(j, q). If q is open, we have a contradiction,
since then c(p, q) tp + j < 2tp. Assume that q is not open. Since q was not opened at
time tq , there must exist an open location q ′ such that c(q, q ′)2tq . But then
c(p, q ′) tp + j + 2tq tp + 3j < 2tp,
a contradiction.
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Next, assume that j is not contained in any open cluster. Let q be the location that deﬁnes
j , i.e., j tq and jc(j, q). Since q is not opened at time tq , there must exist an open
location p with c(q, p)2tq . Thus, c(j, p)j + 2tq3j . 
Lemma 8. Let j ∈ Qi for some facility i ∈ F ′. Then ti3′′j . For each demand j that
does not belong to any set Qk with facility k ∈ F ′, there is a facility i ∈ F ′ such that
c(j, i)3′′j .
Proof. Same as for Lemma 7. 
Lemma 9. The cost of the Steiner tree on the centers is at most∑j∈Q 6′j .
Proof. The proof is given in [7]. 
Lemma 10. The cost of opening facility i ∈ F ′ is at most∑j∈Qi (3′′j − c(j, i)).
Proof.We have fi =∑j∈Qi (ti − c(j, i)). The lemma now follows from Lemma 8. 
Lemma 11. The cost of connecting all demands of an open cluster Qp to facility i(p) is
at most
∑
j∈Qp 6j + 3′′j .
Proof. Let j ∈ Qp. If there exists some open facility i ∈ F ′ with j ∈ Qi , we have
c(j, i) ti3′′j by Lemma 8. Otherwise, if j is not contained in any set Qk with facility
k ∈ F ′, by Lemma 8 there exists an open facility i ∈ F ′ with c(j, i)3′′j . That is, for
each j ∈ Qp, there exists a facility in F ′ within distance at most 3′′j . Since we choose i(p)
from F ′ as the facility that is closest to p, we have
c(p, i(p)) tp + min
l∈Qp
(3′′l ).
Hence,
c(j, i(p))2tp + min
l∈Qp
(3′′l )2tp + 3′′j6j + 3′′j ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 7. 
Let L ⊆ Q denote the set of demands that are not contained in any open cluster.
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Lemma 12. The cost of connecting all demands that are not contained in any open cluster
to the facility of their closest center is at most∑j∈L 6j + 3′′j .
Proof. Let j ∈ L. By arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 11, we can identify
a facility i ∈ F ′ with c(j, i)3′′j . Moreover, due to Lemma 7 there is an open center p
with c(j, p)3j . Let L(p) denote the demands in L whose closest center is p. Then,
c(p, i(p)) minl∈L(p)(3l + 3′′l ). We conclude that
c(j, i(p))3j + min
l∈L(p)(3l + 3
′′
l )6j + 3′′j . 
Lemma 13. The total cost of buying the shortest path between a center p and its facility
i(p) is at most
∑
j∈Qp 3j + 3′′j .
Proof. Each cluster contains at least M demands. The cost of buying the shortest path
between p and i(p) is
M · c(p, i(p))M · (tp + min
l∈Qp
(3′′l ))
∑
j∈Qp
tp + 3′′j
∑
j∈Qp
3j + 3′′j ,
where the ﬁrst inequality was already derived in the proof of Lemma 11 and the last in-
equality follows from Lemma 7. 
Lemma 14. The cost of the solution constructed is at most∑j∈Q 9j + 6′j + 9′′j .
Lemma 15. Every feasible solution to the connected facility location problem on Q has
cost at least max
(∑
j∈Q j , 12
∑
j∈Q ′j ,
∑
j∈Q ′′j
)
.
Proof. The lower bound proofs for
∑
j∈Q j and
∑
j∈Q ′j are given in [7]. Moreover,∑
j∈Q ′′j is a lower bound on the cost of a feasible solution for the facility location game
even without the requirement that the open facilities are connected; see [7]. 
Theorem 2. The cost sharing method , which for each Q ⊆ D, j ∈ Q is deﬁned as
j (Q) = 310j (Q) + 15′j (Q) + 310′′j (Q), is cross-monotonic, competitive, and recovers
at least a 130 -fraction of the optimal cost.
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